Something I have encountered recently is the radical hermeneutic reduction of each area of human knoweldge. This is the idea that a discipline, like, say, theology, need not take the sciences seriously, because the natural sciences are (individually and collectively) just another interpretive paradigm, with no privileged position. The careful reader will notice that not taking something seriously does not necessarily follow from denying something a privileged position...
In any case, I was thinking about this idea, and had the following conclusions:
Let's imagine for a moment that this is the case, and no method of knowing or interpreting reality need take serious the truth claims of any other. If this is so, then a radical reduction of this ends up in an individually relative truth standard, i.e. what is true for me is not true for you, and so forth. What content I give to the term "dog" need not correspond to the content you might give the term, and we use words so equivocally that communication is impossible.
This can be solved by positing communities of understanding, in which multiple persons agree on the content of terms and their methods for interpreting reality. Then communication becomes possible again, on an "interpersonal" standard (which is still not an objective one - but it is held to be subjectively universal, at least for members of that community). This looks like a solution, and may well be the case, if we concede the lack of ability to take a third-person perspective. The problem with this is that none of us belong exclusively to one community of understanding. As individuals in the communities, we must either have a way of communicating between the communities, or exist in permanent cognitive dissonance. The latter seems not to be the case, so we can, I think, safely posit that the communities of understanding (within which hermeneutics of reality are agreed upon) are not fully isolated.
Taking a page from hermeneutic thought, speech itself is the translation of concepts between interlocutors - so the "translatability" of the concepts, at least partially, between communities of understanding is kind of presupposed as discourse, either between individuals or between our (non-schizophrenic!) "parts" of ourselves. If this is the case, then while it is the case that no manner of understanding the world should have a privileged position, but each individual interpretation of reality should take the claims of all others seriously, and they should be at least partially communicable between one another. This doesn't give any sort of ground to say who is right and who is wrong, but it certainly means that, and here it comes, theology has to take the sciences seriously - not as reality defining, but as a part of modern western culture, and as a hermeneutic of reality that, let's face it, to which we belong at least partially.
Another thought is that we all seem to presuppose the rules of logic. While we might posit that a logic-less discourse is possible, I have yet to encounter any statement whatsoever that does not presuppose at least some basic logic (despite claims to the contrary - any sentence with propositional content presupposes logic, so I challenge anyone to present my with non-logical communication). I will close with Wolfhart Pannenberg: "...no argumentation is possible, even in theology, unless there is recognition of the basic principles of identity and contradiction. These principles have always been especially presupposed in efforts to present the systematic unity of Christian doctrine. The scientific nature of theological work rests on their thorough application, even if int he process their concrete form seems more like that of an argument of convenience than that of rational deduction." (ST I, pg. 21 in the English version, can be found on pg. 31 of the original) (My thanks to Gunter Wenz for making me aware of this passage in regard to this discussion)
Today With Zwingli
50 minutes ago