Cloning and Theological Ethics

The recent discussions regarding the advances in cloning technology have recently led to quite a bit of discussion, as well as ethical critique. Initially, I should note that the recent developments are not a matter of reproductive cloning – nonetheless, the technique pioneered would significantly simplify the process of reproductive cloning. This, of course, gets people quite uncomfortable. From a theological standpoint, what is there to say about reproductive cloning?

Well, to start with, one could take the standpoint of Jürgen Habermas: that the idea of all humans being naturally endowed with rights ends where some humans are no longer natural or no longer come about in a natural manner. Thus, the fundamental equality is endangered by reproductive cloning, which is therefore declared unethical. This is, however, not theologically satisfying. The fundamental rights which one wishes to ascribe to humans are from a theological standpoint not rights of the human qua natural human, but of the human qua God’s creation. This is to say that the human-ness of the human and the value of the human are not derived from a sort of naturalness, but rather from the fact that God takes an active part in the determination of that individual as a person and human. If this route were the only one available, it would be all too easy to argue that clones, as non-natural humans, don’t have souls and are deserving of treatment as such.

What about the fundamental inequality, if, as a recent edition of the weekly newspaper “Die Zeit” points out, we have at some point in the future the ability to genetically determine talents and abilities? If Christianity be a religion in which the slave can love the master and the master can love the slave, without requiring external equality, this is not something which cannot be overcome. So-called “natural” talents are also not equal, and it would be foolishness to wish them so. God does not gift all equally, so this can’t in itself be a basis for a theological critique – or should we call it sin to send a child to a better school, for a better education? The difference in the action is only a matter of degree.

We might also take the classic path of criticism, that scientists are “playing God” – whatever that means. After all, it can’t possibly mean new creation, but rather the mere new ordering of existing created things; God as the only one with the capacity to genuinely create new life in the proper sense of the word makes that a theological dead end. Perhaps it refers to the arrogation to oneself of power which is reserved for God. This is familiar territory – after all, what else was the Fall, if not such arrogation of something reserved for God? The thing about the Fall is, the arrogation didn’t work. Satan promised “becoming like God”, yet man’s rebellion against God is only the projection of himself into the place of God, not genuinely taking God’s place. Milton’s Paradise Lost even empties what gain there was when it notes that Adam “his knowledge of Good lost, and Evil got”  (Bk XI Ln. 87) – the gain of knowledge in the attempt at arrogation is truly a loss. Furthermore, if one is arrogating to oneself God’s power by engaging in reproductive cloning, it must not be something reserved only for God, as if He is an earthly ruler whose security system might be bypassed by the clever thief. The conclusion here is, unfortunately, that if it works, it isn’t “playing God”, but rather something which God has obviously allowed humans to do.

So what are we left with? Free self-development. A part of what it means to be human is to be determined by God alone – indeed, through the mediums of culture, society, education and so forth, but in the initial setting of conditions the only one who has a choice in the matter is God. Upon these conditions, the fundamental freedom of the human is to develop himself in whatever direction he might so choose – he is free to be what he will. Factually, the condition of sin determines our choices, but even the allowance of sin in the first place lies with the determination of God; the freedom offered by Christ to turn from sin even more so. The determination by another human of one’s predisposition (genetic altering) amounts to an objectification of an individual, as does the determination by another human of one’s lot in life merely on the basis of origin (clones as non-holders of rights). This objectification of the other is where theological ethics can critique reproductive cloning – but it must do so in the full awareness that this critique applies elsewhere: in the market economy which takes advantage of many for the inordinate gain of the few, in unjust immigration politics, in consumption-oriented behavior which supports the objectification of people across the globe and/or ignores the environmental consequences for others, and even in the day-to-day encounters of those “not like us”: other races, ideologies, opinions, genders, sexual orientations, and so forth.

Theology can critique reproductive cloning when the fundamental relation between humans is held to be that of neighbor-love – yet we as Christians must look to ourselves and our communities, that we live this neighbor-love out. Only from a standpoint of radical difference is this critique justified; perhaps it shows our need for thorough self-critique as well.